Dissecting the *Tahāfut Al-Falāsifah* as the Critism of Ghazali Against the Muslim's Philosopy

Oleh:
Qurrotul Aini
STAIFAS Kencong-Jember Jawa Timur
Email: jayaaini@gmail.com,

Abstract :

This research is the study of library research which raised the criticism of al-Ghazālī against the muslim philosophers in Tahāfut al-Falāsifah. And in this paper there are two questions; first, what is the purpose of al-Ghazālī in writing the Tahāfut al-Falāsifah? Second, Is it true that this work is representation of the conflict between philosophy and dogma; between revelation and the ratio; or between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. By using historical and content analysis to elucidate the criticism of al-Ghazālī against the muslim philosophers in Tahāfut al-Falāsifah. Then, the results of this research are, first al-Ghazālī wrote the Tahafut to do contestation against epistemology philosophical superiority claims, which was directed to their conclusions, instead of questioning the validity of logic as philosophical reasoning methodology. Second, the critism of al-Ghazālī cannot be seen as a reaction of orthodoxy or dogma against the philosophy. He should be viewed as a muslim scholar who has an important role in the naturalization of greek philosophical tradition and its adaptation to the building of islamic thought.

Penelitian ini merupakan kajian kepustakaan yang membahas kritik al-Ghazali terhadap filosof Muslim dalam Tahafut al-Falasifah. Ada dua pertanyaan yang dibahas dalam artikel ini: Pertama, Apa tujuan al-Ghazali dalam tulisannya di Tahafut al-Falasifah? Kedua, apakah benar hal itu merepresentasikan konflik antara filsafat dan dogma agama; antara wahyu dan akal; atau antara ortodoksi dan heterodoksi. Dengan menggunakan analisis historis dan analisis isi, artikel ini akan memaparkan kritik al-Ghazali terhadap filosof muslim dalam Tahafut al-Falasifah. Hasil penelitian ini adalah, pertama tulisan al-Ghazali dalam Tahaut merupakan kontestasi melawan klaim superioritas epistemologi filsafat, yang mana tampak langsung dari kesimpulan mereka, daripada mempertanyakan validitas logis metodologi filsafat. Kedua, kritik al-

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Ghazali tidak bisa dilihat sebagai sebuah reaksi ortodoksi atau dogma melawan filsafat. Dia seharusnya dilihat sebagai cendekiawan muslim yang memiliki peran penting dalam menaturalisasikan tradisi filsafat Yunana dan mengadaptasikannya ke dalam bangunan filsafat Islam.

Keywords :

Islamic Philosophy; Criticism; Tahāfut al-Falāsifah

Introduction

Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī wrote the *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah,* an exposition on the teaching of philosophy who taught by Ibn Sina. In his works which talk on ethics and psychology, like *Mīzān al-Amal*, *Iḥyā''Ulūm al-Dīn*, and *Ma'ārij al-Quds fī Madārij Ma'rifat al-Nafs*, he exposed his ethical and psychological system that apparently he took from Ibn Sina. He also wrote a number of books which confirms the support of aristotelian logic and advocating his theologian fellows and jurist, in order to adopt and exploit the logic in their discipline: *Mi'yār al-'Ilm, Miḥakk al-Naẓar*, dan *al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm*. He evem slipped a chapter that contains the introduction of logic in his main paper about *al-Uṣūl al-Fiqh*; *al-Mustaṣfā min 'Ilm al-Uṣūl.[1]* In the other part, in his famous work, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah,* al-Ghazālī criticized the twenty precept of philosophy which was considered incorect. Not only that, in *Khātimah,* or the cover of the book, he even argued that three among the twenty that he critiqued contrary to the precept of Islam which has been explained by al-Quran and Hadith. Those three precepts are about (1) natural azali (2) that God only know the general aspects of the nature, not the particular, and (3) that the reward and punishment in the afterlife only spiritually, not physical, according to al-Ghazālī.

The Muslim philosophers who believed in third precept have lapsed, therefore, it deserves to be punished firmly by Shari'ah; the death

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[1] Al-Ghazālī, *al-Mustaṣfā min 'Ilm al-Uṣūl*, edited by Ḥamzah ibn Zuhayr Ḥāfiẓ, Vol.4 (Madinah: al-Jāmi'ah al-Islāmiyyah, Kulliyyat al-Sharī'ah, 1413 H/1992-93 M), p.120-175

punishment.[2] Al-Ghazālī repeated this fatwa in some of his other works such us *Fayṣal al-Tafriqah*, *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*, dan *al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl*.[3] How do we explain this mismatch? Borrowing the famous phrase from Ibn Tufyal: "why is al-Ghazālī in a time so tight but while the other being loose?" against the philosophical.[4]

The reviewer of reasoning al-Ghazālī generally perceive his criticism of Islamic philosophy in the *Tahāfut* is part of the conflict between philosophy and dogma; between revelation and the ratio; or between orthodoxy and heterodoxy.[5] Because al-Ghazālī is a representation of the "dogma" or "orthodoxy" while philosophy represents the "rationalism" and "heterodoxy", a number of authors stress that criticism of al-Ghazālī to philosophy have a destructive impact on the rate of the journey of Islamic civilization. Tamim Ansari, in his work which widely read, *Destiny Destrupted,* described al-Ghazālī as Asy'ari theologian who argued that "faith is never possible based on the ratio, but only on revelation".[6] Offensive against the precepts of philosophy in Tahafut, mainly against causality, he thought, 'damaging the entire scientific endeavor.' In short, al-Ghazālī had 'provide ammunition' to 'people who want to turn away from philosophy and natural science' to 'appear respectable and intelligent when they were opposing to the philosophy and reason.'[7]

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[2] Al-Ghazālī, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers / Tahāfut al-Falāsifah 2*, Dwibahasa edition English-Arabic which edited and translated by Michael E. Marmura (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2000), p. 26-227

[3] Look al-Ghazālī, *Fayṣal al-Tafriqah bayna'l-Islām wa al-Zandaqah*, edited by Maḥmūd Bījū (Damaskus: al-Maṭbaʿah al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1993), p. 56-60 (in here al-Ghazālī only mentioned the physical resurrection and the knowledge of God); *Iḥyā''Ulūm al-Dīn I* (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1982), p. 22; al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl / Erreur et delivrance, Dwibahasa edition Arabic-Frenc which edited and translated by Farid Jabre (Beirut: Commission Libanaise pour la Traduction des Chefs-d"Oeuvre, 1969), p. 23-24 (teks Arab).

[4] Ibn Ṭufayl, Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān: *A Philosophical Tale*, translated by Lenn E. Goodman (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1972), p. 101

[5] Look for example, Majid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 223-239.

[6] Tamim Ansary, *Destiny Disrupted: A History of the World through Islamic Eyes* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009), p. 110

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 112, 113. Italics are from the writer.

Al-Ghazālī Encounter to Philosophical Tradition.

There is no accurate information about the birth of al-Ghazālī. 'Abd al-Ghāfir al-Fārisī, fellow contemporaries and the first historians who wrote the biography of al-Ghazālī did not provide information about the year of his birth.[8] Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1201) suspect, he was born in 450 / 1058.[9] Ibn Khallikān (d. 681/1282) also mentioned these dates yet adding that there are other opinions stating that he was born in the year 451/1059.[10] Recently, Frank Griffel suggested the dates so far are the most accurate opinion and based on the autobiographical record of al-Ghazālī own: his personal letters. He argued that al-Ghazālī was probably born between 446/1054 and 448/1057.maybe in 448 1506-7.[11]

The Family background of al-Ghazālī shrouded in confusion. According to Taj al-Din al-Subki (d. 771/1370), al-Ghazālī came from a poor family but pious. Her father reportedly illiterate, and lived with spinning the wool, a profession which is called al-ghazzāl in Khurasan and Jurjan habits, which may be the origin of his name, al-Ghazālī.[12] However, this story is still confusing. Khallikan quoting from Ibn al-Sam'ānī, Persian historian who closest to al-Ghazālī after 'Abd al-Ghafir al-Fārisī who supposedly heard the statement of al-Ghazālī argued that al-Ghazālī ratio was derived from the name of his home town Ghazālah.[13] However Yaqut (w626 /

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[8] ʿAbd al-Ghāfir al-Fārisī wrote the biography of al-Ghazālī in *al-Siyāq li-Tārīkh Naysābūr 6* that has been lost. The biography text comes to us through excerpts or summaries in the works of the next historians. The long version is available in Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyyah al-Kubra, edited by ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ M. al-Ḥilw & Maḥmūd M. al-Ṭanāḥī, 10 jilid (Kairo: Maṭbaʿah ʿĪsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1968), p. 203-214; in short version in Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-Ṣirayfīnī, *al-Muntakhab min al-Siyāq li-Tārīkh Naysābūr*, edited by M.A.ʿAbdal-ʿAzīz (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1989), p. 73-75

[9] Ibn al-Jawzī, *Al-Muntaẓam fī Tārīkh al-Mulūk wa'l-Umam*, edited by Muḥammad and Muṣṭafā ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭā (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1992), p. 17: 124.

[10] Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-Aʿyān wa AnbāʾAbnāʾal-Zamān*, edited by Iḥsān ʿAbbās, 8 jilid (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1968-72), p. 4: 218

[11] Frank Griffel, *al- Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 25. Griffel explained his argument clearly in pages 23-25.

[12] Al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt...*, p. 193

[13] Khallikān, *Wafayāt...*, p. 98

1228), the geographers who visited the Tus in the 13th century did not mention the name of the village in Mu'jam al-Buldan.[14]

Al-Juwaynī[15] probably the most influential teacher in shaping the theological and philosophical thought of al-Ghazālī. As shown by Griffel, al-Juwayni is a reformer of Asy'ari theology in the 11th century. He learned deeply the works of Ibn Sina. Thereby, he realized that regardless of the fact that his thoughts become a serious challenge to the building thought of Asy'ariyah, he also argued that the methodology of Ibn Sina can also be used to update the Asy'ari theology.[16] His thoughts on the ontology and cosmology apparently began to abandon atomism and occasionalism taught by classical Asy'ari theologians.[17] According to Robert Wisnovsky, al-Juwaynī, together with theologians Asy'ari contemporaries, pioneered the movement which he called "a tendency Avicennian in Sunni theology."[18]

After the death of Al-Juwaynī, al-Ghazālī decided to be the escort "wanderer palace" (Mu'askar) Nizam al-Mulk. This Saljuk prime minister, attracted by the intelligence of al-Ghazālī, raised a young intellectual as Nizamiyya professor in Baghdad in 1091. He held this position until the year 1094. This four-year period was the period he wrote the books about theology and philosophy. In these years, he completed a trilogy of philosophy: *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah, Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, and *Mi'yār al-'Ilm*. From those three books, the most candid chronicle writing is *Tahāfut*. Hourani notes, this book was completed on 11 January 1095 Muharram

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[14] Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, *Mu'jam al-Buldān 4* (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1977), p. 49-50.

[15] About the life and works al-Juwaynī, see Paul L. Heck, "Jovayni, Emām al-Ḥaramayn," in Ehsan Yarshater (ed.), *Encyclopaedia Iranica (2009)*; URL = <http://www.iranica.com/articles/jovayni-emam-al-haramayn/>. Accessed On 5th, April, 2012. Look Ormsby, *Ghazali...*, p. 27-29

[16] Griffel, *al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology...*, p. 29-30

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 128-133.

[18] Robert Wisnovsky, "One Aspect of the Avicennian Turn in Sunnī Theology," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy,* 12 (2002), 65-100

488/21.[19] Because Maqasid and Mi'yār written as a supplement of *Tahāfut*, the writing of these two books obviously tied not too far.[20]

Jules Janssens, who did the text analysis on *Maqāṣid* and *Mi'yār*, argued that both of the texts were prepared under the shadow of al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. Maqasid seems to be translation of al-Ghazālī on Ibn Sina which speak in Persian, *Dānish-Nāmeh ʿAlā'ī*; while *Mi'yār* contains a summary of a review of the logic in the works of al-Farabi such as *al-Qiyās al-Ṣaghīr* and *al-Kitab al-Maqūlāt*, and the works of Ibn Sina as *al-Najāt, al-Ishārāt wa'l-Tanbīhāt, Dānish-Nāmeh*, and the book of *al-Ḥudūd*.[21] Al-Ghazālī also wrote the other exposition on the metaphysics of falasifah, which is traditionally called *Mi'yar al-'Aql*, but this book is now only exist in manuscript form that is incomplete.[22]

In 1094, at the command of Al-Mustazhir who newly appointed to be a caliph, al-Ghazali wrote *Faḍā'iḥ al-Bāṭiniyyah wa Faḍā'il al-*

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[19] George F. Hourani, "A Revised Chronology of Ghazālīʻs Writings," *Journal of the American Oriental Society,* 104 (1984),292-293.

[20] The researchers who wrote about the chronology of the al-Ghazali's works generally assumed, because of his eksposisional character, *Maqāṣid* must have been written before *Tahāfut*; and *Mi'yār*, because is an attachment of *Tahāfut*, written afterward. Look Maurice Bouyges, *Essai de Chronologie des Ouvres de al-Ghazali (Algazel)*, edited by Michel Allard (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1959), p. 21-26; ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī, *Mu'allafāt al-Ghazālī* (Beirut: Dār al-Qalam, 1977), p. 53-70; Hourani, "Revised Chronology," p. 292-293. However, Frank Griffel argued that the chronology of these third works, especially *Maqāṣid* and *Tahāfut*, uncertain. There is a possibility that *Tahāfut* written earlier than *Maqāṣid*; or that Maqāṣid was not written as a prelude of *Tahāfut*. Look his argument in *al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology*, p. 35-36; also in "MS London, British Library Or. 3126: An Unknown Work by al-Ghazālī on Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology," *Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2006), p. 1-42. See also the analysis of the Gabriel Said Reynolds, "A Philosophical Odyssey: Ghazzālīʻs Intentions of the Philosophers," in John Inglis (ed.), *Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition in Islam, Judaism and Christianity* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2002), p. 30-41; dan Ayman Shihadeh, "New Light on the Reception of al-Ghazālīʻs Doctrines of the Philosophers (Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa)," in Peter Adamson (ed.), *In the Age of Averroes: Arabic Philosophy in the Sixth/Twelfth Century* (London: The Warburg Institute, 2011), p. 77-92.

[21] Look Jules Janssens, "Le Dānesh-Nāmeh d'Ibn Sīnā: Un texte à revoir?," *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale*, 28 (1987), p. 163-177; together with, "Al-Ghazzālī's Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq: Sources Avicenniennes et Farabiennes," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge*,Vol. 69, No. 1 (2002), p. 39-66.

[22] About this book, look Griffel, "*MS London*."

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Mustaẓhiriyyah, a polemical treatise against the Shi'a Isma'ilis group. This sect become a serious threat to the Seljuq dynasty, both militarily and doctrinaire. Only two years earlier, precisely on the 10th of Ramadan 485/14 October 1092, Niẓām al-Mulk was stabbed by a fidā'ī on his way between Isfahan and Baghdad. The fidā'ī directly killed without had interrogated so there are so many speculations about who the mastermind behind this murder.[23]

This event become the beginning of a political crisis that will be experienced by Dynasty Saljūq in subsequent years. A month later, Malik Shāh died because of a fever which he suffered after hunting. sudden death Malik Shāh immediately sparked competition between his children from three different mothers. Primarily between Barkiyaruq and Mahmud supported his mother, Terken Khatun. Meanwhile, Taj al-Mulk, a rival who was subsequently appointed as a replacement of Niẓām al-Mulk, was killed by Niẓāmiyyah – the supporters of Niẓām al-Mulk. Openly, they accuse Taj al-Mulk as the mastermind behind the murder of Niẓām al-Mulk. This crisis ended with the death of Terken Khatun and her son, Mahmud, and the appointment of Berkiyaruq as sultan.[24]

As a leading Shāfi'ī cleric, al-Ghazālī active in defending the caliphate 'Abbāsiyah on one side; and trying to delegitimize the claims of the groups who are often called the Bāṭiniyyah by his opponents was on the other side.[25] Ghazālī moderate political position is driven by the desire to find a middle ground berween 'idealism' and 'real-politics'[26] He did not hesitate to criticize the political practice of the authorities that he saw the deviated point of view from religious guidance, wrote the political advice to the

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[23] See the different analysis which expressed by the following writers: Omid Safi, *Politics of Knowledge,* p. 74-79; Griffel, *al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology*, p. 36-39

[24] About This Political Events, look Griffel, *al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology*, p. 36-39.

[25] About Al- Ghazālī's polemic against the Shi'a Isma'ilis, look Farouk Mitha, *Al-Ghazālī and the Ismailis: A Debate on Reason and Authority in Medieval Islam* (London: I.B. Tauris cooperating with Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2001)

[26] For the study of political thought of Al-Ghazālī, look Henri Laoust, La politique de Ġazālī (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1970); also Carole Hillenbrand, *"Islamic Orthodoxy or Realpolitik? Al-Ghazālī"s Views on Government,"* Iran, 26 (1988), p. 81-94

sultan, and acted as a courier whenever there is disagreement between the caliph and sultan.

In the month of Dhū'l-Qaʿdah 488 / November 1095, suddenly, *al-Ghazālī* collapsed and suffered "spiritual crisis".[27] according to his own admission in his autobiography, *al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl*, the crisis triggered by the inner consciousness that his motivation for this in the scientific and academic activity are just worldly interests. On the pretext of going to do the Hajj rituals, he secretly traveled to Damascus, Jerusalem, Hebron, and Ḥijāz. In front of the tomb of Abraham in Hebron, he swore to never again visited the ruler, accepted a position from the ruler, and engaged in academic debate.[28] He lived in cities for two years, and recently decided to return to Baghdad because of his longing to the his family.[29] In these years he completed his magnum opus on Sufism, *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*. During his stay in Jerusalem, he also wrote a small treatise on Asy'ari theology which he slipped as chapter three Second Book *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*, *al-Risālah al-Qudsiyyah*.[30] According to his students who came from Maghreb, Abu Bakr Ibn al-'Arabi, al-*Ghazālī* has arrived in Baghdad in 490/1097. In the month of Jumada al-Ākhirah (May-June) that year he studied Ihya ', directly to the own Dānishmand.[31]

In 1106, because of the insistence of Fakhr al-Mulk, al-Ghazālī willing to teach in Nizamiyya Nishapur, filling the position formerly held by his teacher, al-Juwayni. in this time appeared the controversy over his thought.

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[27] This episode in the life of al-Ghazālī has been studied and analyzed by researchers. See the diverse interpretations given by, among others, D.B. Macdonald, "The Life of al-Ghazzālī, with especial reference to his religious experiences and opinions," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 20 (1899), p. 71-132; Farid Jabre,"La biographie,"; Kojiro Nakamura, "An Approach to Ghazālīʿs Conversion," *Orient,* 21 (1985), p. 46-59; Mustafa Abu-Sway, "Al-Ghazālīʿs "Spiritual Crisisʿ Reconsidered,"*Al-Shajara*, 1 (1996), p. 77-94

[28] The oath mentioned by al-Ghazālī in his letter to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Niẓām al-Mulk written on 1110, a year before his death. See the translation of the letter in Jonathan A.C. Brown, "The Last Days of al-Ghazālī and the Tripartite Division of the Sufi World: Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālīʿs Letter to the Seljuq Vizier and Commentary," *The Muslim World*, 96 (2006), p. 89-113. The oath mentioned in pages. 95

[29] Al-Ghazālī, *Munqidh...,* p. 38

[30] Hourani, "*Revised Chronology*," p. 295-297

[31] Abū Bakr Ibn al-ʿArabī, *al-ʿAwāṣim min al-Qawāṣim,* edited by ʿAmmār Ṭālibī (Kairo: Maktabah Dār al-Turāth,1997), p. 24.Dānishmand, "a wise teacher," is a nickname in persian which was pinned by Ibn al-ʿArabī untuk al-Ghazālī.

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The conservative clerics who read the works of "esoteric" al-Ghazali such as *Iḥyā', Mishkāt al-Anwār*, dan *Kīmiyā'-yi Saʿādat*, argued that his thoughts in these books has deviated from tradition Ash'ariyyah and a lot depends on the thinking of Muslim philosophers like Ibn Sina and Ikhwān al-Ṣafā', if it is not even the Zoroastrian teachings. a cleric from the origin of maghrib, *Māzarī al-Dhakī*.[32] active in the campaign against Al- Ghazālī.

The opponents of al-Ghazālī initially delivered a petition to Sanjar that the Hujjat al-Islam:

> *"Don't have any conviction of Islam, otherwise, he embraced the belief of the philosophers and the heretics (Falasifah va mulḥidān) and he filled all his books with their words (va number-yi kitābhā-yi khvīsh bi-sukhun-i Ishan mamzūj kard), He confounded the kufr (Kufr) and the sleaze (abāṭil) with the secrets of revelation. He called the true light of God and this is the belief of the Zoroastrians (madhhab-i majus), which teach the light and the darkness."* [33]

Because it failed in this endeavor, they took another path. Scrape his past, then they issued accusations that al-Ghazālī had issued insulting words against abu hanifah in his work that he wrote in his youth, *al-Mankhūlmin Ta'līqā 'Ilm al-Usul*. Sanjar was an adherent of the Hanafi, this accusation was really serious and expected to ignite the anger of the sultan. But, this attempt was unsuccessful.[34]

In this atmosphere he wrote *Fayṣal al-Tafriqah* And his intellectual autobiography, *al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl*. In the latter book, he offended the attack of the conservative clerics:

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[32] About this figure, and the activities in the campaign against al-Ghazali, look Kenneth Garden, "Al-Māzarī al-Dhakī: Al-Ghazālī"s Maghribi Adversary in Nishapur," *Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2010), p. 89-107

[33] Al-Ghazālī, *Makātib-i fārsī-yī Ghazzālī bi-nām-i faẓa'il al-anām min rasā'il Ḥujjat al-Islām 3*, edited by ʿAbbāsIqbāl (Teheran: Kitābfurūshi-yi Ibn Sīnā, 1333/1954), quoted by Garden, "Al-Māzarī al-Dhakī," p. 93

[34] Regarding these events, look Kenneth Garden, "Al-Ghazālī's Contested Revival: *Iḥyā''Ulūm* al-Dīnand Its Critics in Khorasan and the Maghrib." *Ph.D dissertation.* Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, University of Chicago, 2005, p. 76-143

> *"A group of people who are not solid in the mastery of knowledge and have not yet reached the highest levels in madhhab, count on our writings about the secrets of religious knowledge. They thought these phrases collected from the utterance [the Greek philosophers] ancient, although in part was the result reflection [of our own] – a horse trail may be similar to the footprints of others- and the other horses collected from the books about the Shari'ah, some others even contained in the books of the Sufis. Suppose those phrases were indeed only in Their books, but if the expression is can be accepted by logic, supported by demonstration, and did not contrary to the Qur "an and Hadith, why should be discarded and abandoned?."* [35]

Al-Ghazālī spent the last years of his life in his native Ṭūs by practicing Sufism and teaching. However, the period of uzlah is not without interruption. At 1110, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Niẓām al-Mulk, Sanjar's brother, invited al-Ghazālī to teach back in Nizamiyya Baghdad, replaced the Supreme Master who has just died, al-Kiyāʾ al-Ḥarrāsī. He refused to say that he was no longer interested in "searching for pleasures" (ṭalab bi-ziyādati dunyā) and that his turn was no longer.[36] And indeed shortly afterwards he followed the class comrades. He died in Tus on December 18, 1111.

Throughout his life, al- Ghazālī has written no less than 400 books on various areas of Islamic studies, especially fiqh, usul fiqh, theology, philosophy, and mysticism. Because of the breadth of encyclopedic knowledge about many things, the students of al-Ghazālī often have the difficulty in determining whether he foremost a Jurist, theologians, philosophers, or Sufi. However, irrespective of these difficulties, it is certain that al-Ghazālī studied the philosophy in depth and it affected the style and the character of his writings. His works are well-known logical, systematic, and persuasive. In al-'Awāṣim Min al-Qawāṣim, Abu Bakr Ibn al-'Arabi quoted the impression a cleric named Ahmad ibn Ṣāliḥal-Jili who

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[35] Al-Ghazali, *Munqidh...,* p. 26
[36] Brown, "*Last Days of al-Ghazzālī...*" p. 94-95.

said that "[Al- Ghazālī] steeped in encient studies (philosophy) in such a way to their concept (the philosophers) dominant in his books."[37]

Ibn al-'Arabi looked at his teacher achievement is in his efforts to adopt and assimilate the methodology of philosophy into the building of Islamic thought. When talking about his works in the field of logic for example, he argued that al- Ghazālī has unleashed the syllogism from the elements of philosophy.[38] These assessments, also blasphemies which must be faced by Al-Ghazālī in Nishapur, indicating that the philosophy has a significant influence on his thoughts even after he embraced the mysticism as the way of life.

The structure and the Content of Tahafut al-Falasifah

In *al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl*, al-Ghazālī looked at the work of his *Tahāfut* as a "*radd*," rebuttal or response to the *falāsifah*.[39] As explained by Gimaret,[40] the books are titled *al-Radd 'Ala* ... "response / answer to ..." has sprung up since the century-2H / 4th M. The Radd literature was intended as a rebuttal or response by a writer of the idea or thought of groups who disagree with him. In the field of theology or Kalam, relying heavily on dialectics or academic debate,[41] this literature is abundant. The radd literature in Kalam generally arranged in the format of "discussion" (*kalām*) imaginary with an opponent. In there, the opposing view is presented with details ("*in qīla …*"), followed by the writer's response (*"fa-naqūlu ..."*) such that at the end of the discussion of the establishment of the opponents appear to be inconsistent or contradictory. In short, the

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[37] Abū Bakr Ibn al-ʿArabī, *ʿAwāṣim*, p. 330: "Wa dakhala fīʿulūm al-awāʿil ilāan qāla: wa ghalaba ʿalayh istiʿmālu ʿibārātihimfi kutubihi."

[38] al-ʿArabī., p. 78

[39] Al-Ghazali, *Munqidh...*, p. 18

[40] Daniel Gimaret, "Radd," *Encyclopaedia of Islam 8* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), p. 362b-363b

[41] Josef van Ess, "The Beginnings of Islamic Theology," in John E. Murdoch and Edith D. Sylla (ed.), *The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1975), p. 87-111, argued that Kalam came from and distinctively "dialogue" or "discussion"

establishment was flawed.[42] Tahafut follow this strategy. From this perspective, Tahafut actually is not a work that is unique in its genre.

Al-Ghazālī arranged the Tahafut in three core part. The first part is Muqaddimah or introduction which consists of five sub-topics. The second part, which is the core of the book, is twenty chapters that contain the criticism of al-Ghazālī on twenty philosophical problem that he saw was wrong. Sixteen problems come from the field of metaphysics; and the rest come from the natural sciences. The last part is Khatimah or the cover which only consists of three short paragraphs.

In Muqaddimah, al-Ghazālī explained the background of writing *Tahāfut* in the following paragraphs:

> *"I saw a group of people, who for sure they're different from their friends and colleagues through their unique intelligence and cleverness, rejected the obligations of Islam related to worship, mocked the religious symbols, prayers obligations and the prohibition from illicit goods. They also underestimate to the worship and the provisions of Shari'ah. They did not want to hold back because of the provisions and the prohibition of Syari'ah. Otherwise, they completely broke away from the restraints of the religious ...*
>
> *The base of their disbelief just taqlid as can be found among the Jews and the Christians ... and the speculative contemplation that arise because they stumbled on sophistic doubts that keep them away from the Truth ...*
>
> *The source of their disbelief is that they heard the names of the great [in the tradition of philosophy] such as Socrates, Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, and others, and how their followers described the intelligence, an excess of their principles, and the details of their knowledge of geometry, logic , natural sciences, and metaphysics excessively and misleading. They explained that [the thought] they obtained merely with the ratio was able to find [the*

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[42] Frank Griffel,"*Taqlīd* of the Philosophers: Al-Ghazālī's Initial Accusation in his *Tahāfut*," in Sebastian Günther (ed.), *Ideas, Images, and Methods of Portrayal: Insights into Classical Arabic Literature and Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p. 276

conclusions] are hidden. They also said that in addition to the highly intelligent and full of excess, the philosophers were also deny the Shari'ah and no religion. They rejected the details of the religious law because they're sure that the laws are only human creation and tricks.

When this information reached them, and the information about the teachings of [the philosopher] accordance with their nature, they preened with kurf, in order to align with the sage, they said! They joined with [the philosophers]; exalteth himself above most people and the laity; and underestimate to the complacency against the religious beliefs of their ancestors. They thought that exposing the intelligence with leave to the right teaching of taqlid and then doing taqlid to the teachings that vanity is good. They did not realize that switching from a form of taqlid to the other taqlid is [a sign of] ignorance and confusion.''[43]

Through the paragraphs above, al-Ghazālī told us that writing *Tahāfut* motivated by antagonism toward of intellectuals' lifestyle who claim to be adherents of the teachings of philosophy. They're reluctant to execute the commands of religion such as prayer or Shari'ah prohibitions such as drinking wine. this attitude, in his search, pushed by two things: first the vanity and superior feelings than his colleagues, the second, blind taqlid to the classical Greek philosophers. This taqlid departed from the assumption that all of the classical Greek philosophers' teachings, began from mathematics till metaphysics, derived from solid and demonstrative contemplation, so it was impossible wrong.

The accusation that the adherents of the philosophy only doing taqlid to "the great names" in their tradition significant. As generally the theologians Asy'ari, Al-Ghazālī created the opposition between *'ilm* and *taqlid* or between '*āmmah* and *khāṣṣah*. This's in contrast to opposition of distinction status according to the level of the knowledges. '*āmmah* Group is mostly people who are not literate or do not have the knowledge; they can only doing taqlid to others to gain knowledge or beliefs. Meanwhile, khāṣṣah is an educated class that is able to do his own reasoning without

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[43] Al-Ghazali, *Tahāfut...*,p. 1-2.

relying on others. In *al-Iqtiṣād fī'l-I'tiqād*, al-Ghazālī explained that *'ilm al-kalām* is a fardhu kifayah science, and that science is only mandatory for the educated who have the intelligence and was having doubts as to hang out and streams or –destructive teachings.[44]

Most lay people just enough to do taqlid to the clerics or the theologians. However, doing taqlid to others is a big mistake for intellectuals who are able to think by them selves. For this educated class, the only individual who deserve to be followed is the Prophet Muhammad. In Faysal al-Tafriqah, Al-Ghazālī wrote:

> *"If you ponder this problem honestly, you will realize that anyone who restricts the truth only on a thinker has approached to the disbelief and the hypocrisy. First, he approached the kufr because he puts a thinker on par with the infallible Prophet... Secondly, he approached the hypocrisy because the job of a thinker is to contemplation and taqlid is illegitimate for him. How could he talk [to the students], "You have to think for by yourself; but thinking, you also should not produce the distorted thought of my thoughts "... would not this hypocritical?."*[45]

The *Tahāfut* written to delegitimize the epistemological superiority claims which recognized by Falasifah. Al-Ghazālī wanted to prove that not all of the teachings of the classical philosophers have reached the level of demonstrative as claimed by their followers.[46] Thus, the purpose of The *Tahāfut* is fully of destructive, is not constructive. Through this work, he wanted to unload, doesn't build. Because that The Tahāfut methodologically is fully of dialectical character. Al-Ghazālī wrote:

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[44] Al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtiṣād fī'l-I'tiqād*, edited by Ibrāhīm A. Çubukçu dan Huseyin Atay (Ankara: Nur Matbaasi, 1962), p. 11

[45] Al-Ghazali, *Fayṣal al-Tafriqah*, p. 22-23. Teks Bījū using *tanāquḍ* words, "contradiction" for "hypocritical" my translate follows Griffel, "Taqlīdof the Philosophers" p. 281.

[46] Jules Janssens, "Al-Ghazālī's Tahāfut: Is It Really a Rejection of Ibn Sīnā's Philosophy?," *Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2001), p. 1-17, doing hujjah that the target of The Tahafut attack "seems to be the philosophy of ancient [Greece], especially metaphysics, and acceptance of its teachings uncritically," is not Ibn Sina. This opinion seems rather hard to accept.

> *"Know that my goal [in this book] is to remind people who have a good prejudice both to the philosophers and believe that their method is free from contradiction with show [some] in terms of their confusion. For this reason, I would not argue with them except as a demanding and reneged, not one who claims [and] affirms. I will destroy their belief with [show] the consequences to the contrary. So, sometimes I would force them to follow the teachings of Mu'tazilah, at other times Karrāmiyah teachings, but at other times Wāqifiyah teachings. However, I did not intend to defend one of these madhhabs. I just make the madhhabs as a weapon against them."[47]*

Al-Ghazālī reminded that we could not simply contrasts between philosophy and religion. According to him, there are three possible religion positions that opposed with the philosophy. The first is the difference which is just purely verbal problem, as is the habit of the philosophers to refer to God as a "substance." According to him, the problem like this is not necessary disputed because in essence, both the philosophers and ordinary Muslims alike believe in the existence of God and argue that it will only end on the lexical dispute.[48]

The second aspect is the doctrine of the philosophers which did not contrary with the fundamentals of religion. Al-Ghazālī divided the the field of philosophical studies into six fields: (a) the arithmetic, (b) logical, (c) the natural sciences, (d) metaphysics, (e) political and (f) ethics.[49] Among the six fields of this study, The Tahāfut poured out only to question a number of Falasifah conclusions in the field of metaphysics and natural science. Their thoughts in other fields, such as politics, ethics, and even more arithmetic, which demonstrably undeniable the truth, he may not refuse for religious reasons. While joked, Al-Ghazālī wrote, "Rejecting this issue is not a prerequisite of faith in the prophets and apostles."[50]

The last aspect is the doctrine of the philosophers which obviously contrary to the fundamentals of religion as their teachings in the natural

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[47] Al-Ghazali, *Tahāfut...*, p. 7-8.

[48] *Ibid.,* p. 5.

[49] Al-Ghazali, *Munqidh...*, p. 20-25.

[50] Al-Ghazali, *Tahāfut...*, p. 5-6.

creation problem, the attributes of God, and the physical resurrection of the humand race on the Day of Judgment later.[51] According to him, the Tahāfut written to reject the doctrine of this last category are classified. twentieth chapters of Tahāfut are arranged in an imaginary dialogue format between al- Ghazālī and Muslim philosophers who believe his thesis. Every argument which he advances are broken by al-Ghazālī with the arguments which he had taken from the various sources.

Thereby, Al-Ghazālī did not intend to delegitimize the logic of a methodology of thinking. He only intended to prove that a number of the *falāsifah* theses in metaphysics and natural science did not reach a prerequisite demonstrative (Burhan / apodeixis) as determined by their own. At the end of Muqaddimah Tahāfut, al-Ghazālī asserted:

> *"We will show that in the field of metaphysics, they (the falāsifah) are unable to fulfill the preconditions set out in the various parts of the logic and the introduction, as they described in the book Al-Burhān about the terms of the truth of the syllogism, premise, and in the book of al-qiyas about the terms of the syllogism figure, and other things which they teach in Isagogedan Categoriae."*[52]

The twenty chapters of *Tahāfut* which talk about the philosophy themes ranging from nature up to the physical resurrection of on the Day of Resurrection, directed by the same spirit: Suing demonstrabilitas the *falāsifah* theses. The problem is not whether these theses are right or wrong, but whether these theses can be proved demonstratively or not. In chapter 17 of Tahafut, for example, that explore the theory of causality,[53]

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[51] *Ibid.,* p. 7.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 16. Compare with *Munqidh*, p. 22.

[53] This theme has been widely discussed and analyzed by the students of al-Ghazālī. Among others are: Lenn E. Goodman, "Did al-Ghazālī Deny Causality?" *Studia Islamica,* 47 (1978), p. 83-120; Ilai Alon, "Al-Ghazālī on Causality," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 100 (1980), p. 397-405; Michael E. Marmura, "Al-Ghazālī's Second Causal Theory in the 17th Discussion of his Tahāfut," in Parviz Morewedge (ed.), *Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism* (Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books, 1981), p. 85-112; Stephen Riker, "Al-Ghazali on Necessary Causality in The Incoherence of the Philosophers," *The Monist*, Vol. 79, No. 3 (1996), p. 315-324; George Giacaman and King Bahlul, "Ghazālī on Miracles and Necessary Connection," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology*, 9 (2000), p. 39-50; Leor Halevi, "The Theologian's Doubts: Natural

deployed to delegitimize the theory of causality of Ibn Sina. Here, al-Ghazālī's goal is not to reject the theory of causality, but rather to destroy the thesis of Ibn Sina that the causal relationship is necessary and essential; and that this thesis has achieved the demonstrative status.[54] The strategy is currently suing demonstrability of Ibn Sina's theory will probably remind us to the strategy of the empiricists such as David Hume. he wrote :

> *"The relationship between something that is customarily believed as the cause and something that is believed as a result it is not necessarily in our opinion. Otherwise [if exist] two objects, where one is not the other, and the affirmation that the first object is not sure to affirm the existence of other objects as well as objects first negation is not necessarily negate the other objects, it is not necessarily the existence of the first objects that would require the presence of other objects and the absence of the first things that do not necessarily require the absence of other objects-for example, between satisfying the thirst and drinking, satiety and eating, burning and fire, light and the rising of the sun, death and beheadings, healing and taking medication, ... and the other examples that can be observed in the objects that are linked in medicine, astronomy, art, and skill. the Interrelation ship between the two is because of the ordinance of God who created it together, not because both are necessary and inseparable. On the contrary, [God] is able to create satiety without eating, death without beheading, maintaining life after beheading, and so on. The falāsifah rejected the the possibility of [this] and considered impossible."[55]*

At a glance, a rebuttal of al-Ghazālī above seems to be aiming to defend the establishment of okasionalis about the nature. However, instead of defending Occasionalism, he instead emphasized the phenomenal characteristics of natural events such as the burning of fabrics after

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Philosophy and the Skeptical Games of Ghazālī," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 63, No. 1 (2002), p. 19-39

[54] Goodman, "Did al-Ghazālī,"; Griffel, *al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology*, p. 147.

[55] Al-Ghazali, *Tahāfut...*,p. 166

contacting with the fire and that the phenomenon can be explained by two theories are equally valid:

> *"They did not have any evidence other than the observation that the combustion occurs after contacting with flame. Observation (mushāhadah) only shown the events that took place after (al-ḥuṣūl 'indahu), not because (al-ḥuṣūl bihi) [something else] and that there's no cause ('illah) again in others."[56]*

Then, al-Ghazālī sequentially exposes both theories. The first is okasionalis theory which argues that the only agent who creates the event scorching of the fabric is God, not the fire, whether directly or through an intermediary angels.[57] The second theory explains that the objects in the nature does have specific properties and causality, but in a secondary sense. The causal relationship arises because of the provision or the ordinance of God, not because its essence should be as such.[58] Here, al-Ghazālī did not explain which of two theories that he follow.

Adaptation and appropriation The teachings of Philosophy in Al-Ghazālī's Thought

Al-Ghazālī's rejection against a number of the Falasifah theses in metaphysics and natural science implying that he did not object to their theses in other fields or even their approach and methodology in philosophy generally. This attitude that he showed in some of his other works. Regarding the validity of the logic as a methodology of thinking, for example, he stressed that this science is the discipline of neutral knowledge. In one of his polemic against the Isma'ilis, *al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqim*, al- Ghazālī reads several verses which he patterns according to figures of categorical and disjunctive syllogism.[59] Through this book, al-Ghazālī certainly does not mean to say that the syllogism Aristotelian and

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[56] Al-Ghazali, *Tahāfut...*,p. 167

[57] *Ibid.*

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 169-170

[59] Al-Ghazālī, *al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm*, edited by Victor Chelhot (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1983). The best study about this book is Rosalind W. Gwynne, *Logic, Rhetoric, and Legal Reasoning in the Qur'ān: God's Arguments* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); dan Martin Whittingham, *al-Ghazālī and the Qur'ān: One Book, Many Meanings* (London: Routledge, 2007).

Stoic "supported" by the verses of the Qur'an, but that, in essence, the ratio and the revelation teach the same things and come to the equal conclusion. In Munqidz, al-Ghazālī reminds every Muslim in order not to get stuck in one of two extreme attitudes in dealing with philosophy. The first is to blindly accept to anything that is taught by the philosophers without investigating the status and level of the truth. Many people are just seeing the ancient Greek philosophers are experts who unrivaled in the field of the logic or mathematics conclude that their teachings on metaphysics must have the same degree of accuracy as mathematics. According to al-Ghazālī, this is the error which arise because of blind taqlid.[60]

The second Extreme attitude is that some believers who have religious fervor strong but do not have enough the base of knowledge (ṣadīq jāhil) just see the falsafah in terms of his teachings that misguided and concluded that all the ideas of the philosophers are wrong, even that has proved demonstratively by logic. They are in the sarcastic phrase of al-Ghazālī, thought that the religion of Islam is based on stupidity and do not realize that their attitude contains a great danger. They do not understand that such an attitude will push the intelligentsia that are studying philosophy thought that Islam is indeed a religion that against science or wisdom and they will move away from religion.[61]

For al-Ghazālī, it seems rejecting the demonstrability theses of the Falasifah is one thing; while accepting and utilizing these theses in his own thoughts is something else. In Tahafut, al-Ghazālī emphasizes that men of the Falasifah is not able to prove "the existence of God," or that "God is one."[62] But, of course it does not mean that al-Ghazālī do not believe in the existence of God or monotheism. Here, he just tries to show that the evidences advanced by Muslim philosophers do not reach the level of demonstrative. However, the thought that is not demonstrative is not necessarily wrong and can be utilized in other respects.

Al-Ghazālī's attitude against the psychology of Ibn Sina is an interesting example. In Tahafut, al-Ghazālī provides a special chapter to criticize the psychology of *faylasūf* who holds al-Shaykh al-Ra'īs, ie chapters 18 and

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[60] Al-Ghazali, *Munqidh...*, p. 21
[61] *Ibid.,*, p. 21-22
[62] Al-Ghazali, *Tahafut...Vol.4 and 5*.

19. However, it does not prevent him from utilizing the teachings of Ibn Sina to explain his own thoughts. This is what he did, for example, in *Ihya' 'Ulum al-Dīn*. This book is a manual on the practice of Sufism. Inside it, al- Ghazālī invites Muslims to practice the teachings of the Shari'ah (*mu'āmalah*) in the various fields. With this practice, it is expected they will get "enlightenment" or *mukāshafah*,[63] the highest knowledge in epistemological hierarcy of the sufis. The highest in the hierarchy of epistemological knowledge of the Sufis. However, when trying to explain the psychological foundation of this theory in Book XX *Iḥyā'*, he borrowed the theory of Ibn Sina about the psychology.[64] In *Mishkāt al-Anwār*, he modifies the terminology preface when he wrote that human perception (*rūḥ*) is divided into five: (a) the spirit of sense (*al-rūḥ al-ḥissī*), (b) the spirit of imaginative (*al-rūḥ al-khayālī*), (c) intellectual spirit (*al-rūḥ al-ʿaqlī*), (d) discursive spirit (*al-rūḥal-Fikri*), and the spirit of the holy Prophet (*al-rūḥal-Qudsi al-Nabawi*). [65]

Al- Ghazālī's rejection to the theory of of causality which expressed by the Falasifah do not imply that he believes of extreme okasinalisme or that he does not believe in the theory of causality. In the Ihya ', al-Ghazālī warned Muslims:

> *"If you expected God to make you full without bread, or making bread moves to you, or order his angels to chew for you and watched it move to your stomach-it will only show the folly of his actions!"[66]*

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[63] About both "key words" in this al-Ghazālī tasawwuf, *Mu'āmalah and Mukāshafah*, see Avner Gilʿadi, "On the Origin of Two Key-Terms in al-Ġazzālī"s *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*," *Arabica*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (1989), p. 81-92

[64] Al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā'*... 3, p. 5-7. See also Peter Heath, "Reading al-Ghazālī: The Case of Psychology," in Todd Lawson (ed.), *Reason and Inspiration in Islam*: *Theology, Philosophy and Mysticism in Muslim Thought* (London: I.B. Tauris in cooperation with Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2005), p. 185-199; Jamāl Rajab Sīdbī, *Naẓariyyat al-Nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa al-Ghazālī* (Kairo: al Hayʾah al-Miṣriyyah al-ʿĀmmah liʾl-Kitāb, 2000).

[65] Al-Ghazālī, *The Niche of Lights / Mishkāt al-Anwār*, billingual edition English-Arabic, edited and translated by David Buchman (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1998), p. 36-37.

[66] *Iḥyā'*,4: p. 249; quoted by Ormsby, Ghazali, p. 80

He also utilizes the hierarchy of being Ibn Sina to explain the meaning of
a text of five levels of existence in Faysal al-Tafriqah. In this book, al-
Ghazali explained that form which designated by a word in the text of
Qur'ān or Hadith has five possible forms of existence: (a) The realization
of essential (*al-wujūd al-dhātī*), (b) a form of sensory (*al-wujūd al-ḥissī*),
(c) the form of imaginative (*al-wujūd al-khayālī*), (d) intellectual form (*al-
wujūd al-ʿaqlī*), and (e) the metaphorical form (*al-wujūd al-shibhī*).[67] This
Al- Ghazālī's theor, as shown by Griffel,[68] apparently levied from Ibn
Sina's theory about the inner senses (al-Hawass al-Batinah). The
conservative clerics attacks that must be faced by him in Nishapur when
al- Ghazālī was teaching at Nizamiyya there must have been motivated by
"insertion" the teachings of the Falasifah in his works this. As a result, the
readers of al- Ghazālī who switched from *Tahāfut* to the other works, will
get the impression that the book is called first, he was doing "game
skeptical" (skeptical games) against the theses of the Falasifah.[69]

Closing

This article, hopefully can provide some important conclusions about al-
Ghazālī's views on philosophy and the role of *Tahāfut* al-Falasifah in it.
The first is al-Ghazālī wrote Tahafut for contestation against the
philosophy epistemological superiority claims. In the 20 chapters of this
book he rejected the claim that the conclusions of the classical
philosophers (in particular themes in the field of metaphysics and natural
science) has achieved the status of a demonstrative as recognized by his
followers. Thereby, al-Ghazālī's criticism against the Falasifah simply
directed at their conclusions. He was not questioning the validity of the
logic of as the methodology of philosophical reasoning. In contrast, al-
Ghazālī accepts the logic of the thought methodology and demonstration
criteria (Burhan / apodeixis) as a tool to measure the scientific truth and
take advantage of this methodology to sue the Falasifah conclusions. thus,
Al-Ghazālī is fully rationalist in his thought.

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[67] Al-Ghazali, *Fayṣalal-Tafriqah*, p. 33-39.
[68] Frank Griffel, "Al-Ġazālī's Concept of Prophecy: The Introduction of
Avicennan Psychology into Ašʿarite Theology," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy*, 14
(2004), p. 101-144.
[69] Leor Halevi, "Theologian's Doubts."

The second, as a consequence, the role of al-Ghazālī in the development of philosophy in Islam should not be seen as a destructive. The criticism of al-Ghazālī in *Tahāfut* can not be seen as a reaction to the philosophical dogma or orthodoxy. He should be seen as a Muslim cleric who holds an important role in naturalization and adaptation of the Greek philosophical tradition into the building of Islamic thought. Al-Ghazālī is an eclectic thinker and tend synthesis. The teachings of philosophy which he mistakenly view he eliminated; while the other elements which he view as neutral he adopted, and he adapted into his thought system. For example, he advocated to use Aristotelian logic in usul fiqh and Kalam; while the neo-Platonic cosmology and Avicennian psychology he utilized in theology and mystical teachings. After the death of al-Ghazālī, the philosophy has ceased to be a school of thought that stands alone. However, the particular aspects of his thought system absorbed and integrated into the system of Kalam or mysticism.

Tahāfut is an influential book in the scientific tradition of Islam in subsequent periods. However, its impact should not be overstated. The book indeed immediately sparked other writings which following al-Ghazālī, argued the refutation of the Falasifah teachings.[70] But, the critics of this book was not a little bit. Ironically, the main critics of Tahafut are students or the heirs of al- Ghazālī 's own thoughts. The earliest was Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, eccentric Ash'ari theologian of the 12th century. In a series of public debate which he did in Iran, openly he discredited of *Tahāfut* and considered methodologically weak.[71] In the West, a major critic of al-Ghazālī is Ibn Rushd.[72] He wrote Tahafut al-Tahafut to prove that the

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[70] Regarding the earliest followers of al- Ghazālī, especially in Iran, see Griffel,*al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology*, p. 61-95.

[71] Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Munāẓarāt Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī fī Bilād Mā Warā'al-Nahr*, edited by Fathallah Kholeif (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1987), p. 60-61. See also Griffel, *al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology*, p. 116-120.

[72] Here may be so important to emphasize that the terms of the genealogy of thought, Ibn Rushd was a disciple or the followers of al-Ghazālī. He was a disciple of Abū Jaʿfar al-Turjālī and Abū Bakr Ibn al-ʿArabī. The last, we know, direct disciple of Dānishmand. Debt of gratitude Ibn Rushd to al-Ghazālī is bigger than which we assume. He among other things wrote an overview of the major works of al-Ghazālī about the origin of fiqh, *al-Mustaṣfā*. His theories about the text interpretation method is also levied from the view of al-Ghazali. See Frank Griffel, "The Relationship between Averroes and al-Ghazālī as it presents itself in Averroes'' Early Writings, especially in his Commentary

works of al-Ghazālī was "largely has not reached yet the level of demonstrative [as he claims]."[73] Finally, in the 15th century, Khojazādeh peeled the weaknesses of al- Ghazālī's approach in responding to the teachings of the philosophy.[74]

The analysis has been presented by the writers about the "influence" Tahafut on the rate of Islamic thought during this seems more boosted pre assumtion and the generalizations who can not be maintained. Because in Tahafut, al-Ghazālī denied the theses of Muslim philosophers; and it is assumed that the assessment of rational sciences and philosophy in decline since the 5th century / 11th until now, so al-Ghazālī must have a stake in this deterioration process. The Recent studies about the development of the philosophy study and logic in the Islamic world after the 5th century / 11th show that the assumptions and the generalizations is not true. [75] Instead regarded as a work that is "ruining entire scientific endeavor" as alleged by Ansary, *Tahāfut* should be regarded as a representation of the emergence of criticism Nominalist[76] against Aristotelian philosophy. Nominalism is usually understood as a school of thought which rejects the existence of abstract objects or the universal in metaphysics. Through Tahafut, al-Ghazālī challengs the Peripatetic philosopher to prove their theses elegantly. He challengs them not to be dogmatic in scientific discourse, but that is always open to any critical and alternative thought

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on al-Ghazālī's al-Mustaṣfā," in John Inglis (ed.), *Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition in Islam, Judaism and Christianity* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2002), p. 51-63.

[73] Ibn Rushd, *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut,* edited by Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābirī (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥdah al-ʿArabiyyah, 1998), p. 105.

[74] See Ayman Shihadeh, "Khojazāda on al-Ghazālī's Criticism of the Philosophers' Proof of the Existence of God," in Tevfik Yücedoğru, OrhanKoloğlu, MuratKılavuz, and Kadir Gömbeyaz, (ed.), *International Symposium on Khojazada* (22-24 October 2010 Bursa): Proceedings(Bursa: Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2011), p. 141-161.

[75] See other, A.I. Sabra, "The Appropriation and Subsequent Naturalization of Greek Science in Medieval Islam: A Preliminary Statement," *History of Science*, 25(1987), p. 223-243.

[76] about this stream, see Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Nominalism in Metaphysics," in Edward N. Zalta(ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2011 Edition). URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/nominalism-metaphysics/>. Accessed on 5, april,2012

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